LINEAR QUADRATIC NONZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAMES WITH RANDOM JUMP

The existence and uniqueness of the solutions for one kind of forward-backward stochastic differential equations with Brownian motion and Poisson process as the noise source were given under the monotone conditions.Then these results were applied to nonzero-sum differential games with random jumps to get the explicit form of the open-loop Nash equilibrium point by the solution of the forward-backward stochastic differential equations.     

CONSTRAINED MULTIOBJECTIVE GAMES IN LOCALLY CONVEX H-SPACES

IntroductionTheconceptofanequilibriumpointforann_persongamewasfirstintroducedbyNash[1,2 ],whoestablishedtheexistenceoftheequilibriumpointundercertainassumptions.Sincethen ,theNashequilibriumproblemforn_persongameshavebeenintensivelystudiedandextendedbyanumberofauthorsundervariousassumptionsanddifferentdirections.Theconstrainedgameswithfiniteorinfiniteplayersisanimportantgeneralizationofn_persongameswhichhavebeenwidelystudiedbymanyauthors.Recently ,muchattentionhasbeenfocusedonthegameproblemsw…     

Quantum Game with Restricted Matrix Strategies

We study a quantum game played by two players with restricted multiple strategies. It is found that in this restricted quantum game Nash equilibrium does not always exist when the initial state is entangled. At the same time,we find that when Nasli equilibrium exists the payoff function is usually different from that in the classical counterpart except in some special cases. This presents an explicit example showing quantum game and classical game may differ.When designing a quantum game with limited strategies, the allowed strategy should be carefully chosen according to the type of initial state.     

Scheme for Implementation of Quantum Game in Cavity QED

We propose an experimentally feasible scheme to implement two-player quantum game in cavity quantum electrodynamics （QED）. During the process, the cavity is only virtually excited, thus our scheme is insensitive to the cavity field states and cavity decay. The scheme can be realized in the range of current cavity QED techniques.     

基于体感技术的游戏重构框架的应用研究

为满足体感游戏市场需求,降低3D游戏前期投入风险,文章提出通过开发中间件模块对游戏开发过程进行简单改造,实现3D游戏向体感游戏平滑过渡的过程。先是简单介绍了体感技术的原理和工作过程,接着结合Kinect硬件系统提出了3D游戏到体感游戏重构框架（3D-MS重构框架）,然后设计和实现了中间件模块,并对现有3D游戏的提出具体改进策略和方法。最后以《神龙》游戏为案例进行了重构和实验测试,实验表明3D-MS重构框架是可行的,采用中间件技术可平滑、快速实现从3D游戏到体感游戏,比直接改造游戏的效率高2.2倍,同时能提高游戏的人机互动效果。     

A general framework for cooperation under uncertainty

In this paper, we introduce a general framework for situations with decision making under uncertainty and cooperation possibilities. This framework is based upon a two stage stochastic programming approach. We show that under relatively mild assumptions the associated cooperative games are totally balanced. Finally, we consider several example situations.     

Monotonicity in the stock competition game with consumer search

Anupindi and Bassok investigate the impact of centralizing the stocks in a one-manufacturer-two-retailer supply chain with consumer search. They observed through numerical studies that in the decentralized scenario, the retailers’ order quantities are monotonic in the consumer search probability. This paper provides an analytical justification of this monotonicity.     

中短途汽车客运问题博弈分析

汽车客运尤其是中短途汽车客运在人们的现代生活中发挥重要的作用,它在拥有众多长处的同时也存在着许多问题和不足.从经济博弈论的角度,对客运车主和交通管理部门的行为进行分析,从而说明违规运营现象存在的原因并提出相应的解决措施.     

An oracle based method to compute a coupled equilibrium in a model of international climate policy

This paper proposes a computational game-theoretic model for the international negotiations that should take place at the end of the period covered by the Kyoto protocol. These negotiations could lead to a self-enforcing agreement on a burden sharing scheme given the necessary global emissions limit that will be imposed when the real extent of climate change is known. The model assumes a non-cooperative behavior of the parties except for the fact that they will be collectively committed to reach a target on total cumulative emissions by the year 2050. The concept of normalized equilibrium, introduced by J.B. Rosen for concave games with coupled constraints, is used to characterize a family of dynamic equilibrium solutions in an m-player game where the agents are (groups of) countries and the payoffs are the welfare gains obtained from a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The model deals with the uncertainty about climate sensitivity by computing an S-adapted equilibrium. These equilibria are computed using an oracle-based method permitting an implicit definition of the payoffs to the different players, obtained through simulations performed with the global CGE model GEMINI-E3. Partly supported by GICC (French Ministry of Ecology), TOCSIN (EU-044287) and the Swiss-NSF NCCR-Climate program of the Swiss NSF. For helpful comments and discussions, we thank A. Bernard, P. Thalmann, and the anonymous referee.